Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini
Rutgers University Department of Philosophy
106 Somerset Street, 5th Floor
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
I am a graduate student in the philosophy department at Rutgers University.
Before coming here, I completed an MPhil in Philosophical Theology at the University of Oxford and studied Organismic and Evolutionary Biology and Philosophy at Harvard College. In the summer of 2014, I was a visiting student at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at LMU. I returned to Oxford as a guest of the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Project for Trinity Term 2015, and again as a visiting graduate student for Trinity Term 2016. In Fall 2017, I was a visiting student at USC.
My interests include the philosophy of language, formal epistemology, the philosophy of mind, decision theory, logic, and the philosophy of religion.
''Radically Insensitive Theists'' Religious Studies (forthcoming). [Official] [Penultimate]
Abstract: Sceptical theists attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. Drawing on an exchange between William Rowe and Michael Bergmann, I argue that consistent sceptical theists must be radically insensitive to certain kinds of evidence about prima facie evils Ė that is, that they must endorse the claim that not even evidence of extreme and pervasive suffering could justify disbelief in theism. I show that Bergmannís attempt to respond to this problem does not succeed and argue that no alternative response is forthcoming, concluding that the threat of radical insensitivity constitutes a serious and underappreciated difficulty for sceptical theism.
Abstract: Greg Ray (2014) believes he has discovered a crucial oversight in Donald Davidsonís semantic programme, recognition of which paves the way for a novel approach to Davidsonian semantics. We disagree: Rayís novel approach involves a tacit appeal to pre-existing semantic knowledge which vitiates its interest as a development of the Davidsonian programme.Works in Progress
Summary: I argue that the propositional object of a speakerís assertoric commitment is not always the propositional object on which she and her interlocutors doxastically coordinate in response to her assertion. Along the way, I present a series of novel arguments against Stalnakerís principle of uniformity.(Name Redacted for Blind Review).
Summary: I show how Stalnakerís principle of uniformity follows from the central aims and assumptions of his framework for modeling discourse.(Name Redacted for Blind Review).
Summary: I propose a novel semantics for slurs.Recent and Upcoming Presentations*